Toulmin’s Model of Argument and the Question of Relativism

In The Uses of Argument, Toulmin proposed a distinction between field-dependent and field-invariant standards for argument appraisal that gave rise to a relativistic understanding of his theory. The main goal of this paper is to show that epistemological relativism is not a necessary consequence of Toulmin\u27s model of argument. To this end, I will analyze the role that fields are to play within this model, given a certain conception of one of its key elements: the warrant of an argument

Two Conceptions of Rhetoric and their Role in Argumentation Theory

I make a distinction between a traditional conception of Rhetoric as a corpus of practical knowledge to improve persuasive abilities, and a more contemporary conception of Rhetoric as a hermeneutic discipline for dealing with communicative activities as a means of influence. I argue that the key difference between both conceptions is whether or not they deal with the rhetorical properties of discourses as a matter of speakers’ intentions

Second Order Intersubjectivity: The Dialectical Aspect of Argumentation

Following Rescher’s (1977) conception of dialectics, I argue for the view that the dialectical aspect of argumentation enables a “second order intersubjectivity”, to be understood in terms of the recursive nature of the activity of giving and asking for reasons. This feature underlies that most argumentative discourses represent the explicit part of a dynamic activity, “a mechanism of rational validation” (Rescher, 1977: xiii) which presupposes the possibility of attaining objectivity

Assessing presumptions in argumentation: Being a sound presumption vs. being presumably the case

This paper is an attempt to identify and provide the normative conditions for presumptions and for presumptive inferences. Basically, the idea is adopting the distinction between epistemic and ontological qualifiers proposed in Bermejo-Luque (2011) in order to explain the difference between something being a correct presumption and something being presumably the case

Deduction without dogmas: the case of moral analogical argumentation

In a recent paper, Fábio Perin Shecaira (2013) proposes a defence of Waller’s deductivist schema for moral analogical argumentation. This defence has several flaws, the most important of them being that many good analogical arguments would be deemed bad or deficient. Additionally, Shecaira misrepresents my alternative account as something in between deductivism and non-deductivism. This paper is both an attempt at solving this misunderstanding and an analysis and criticism of Waller and Shecaira’s forms of deductivism.Dans un article récent, Fábio Perin Shecaira (2013) défend l’approche déductiviste de Waller pour évaluer des arguments par analogie traitant de sujets moraux. Cette défense a plusieurs défauts, le plus important d'entre eux est que plusieurs bons arguments par analogie seraient jugés mauvais ou faibles. En outre, Shecaira dénature mon approche alternative en la décrivant comme quelque chose entre un déductivisme et un non déductivisme. Je tente à la fois de résoudre ce malentendu et d’offrir une analyse et une critique des formes de deductivisme de Waller et de Shecaira.The work presented in this paper has been financed by a Ramón y Cajal Research Fellowship of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation and by the research projects FFI2011-23125 and FFI2011-24414 of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation

What should a normative theory of argumentation look like?

Within the epistemological approach to Argumentation Theory, there are two opposing views on what a theory of argumentation should look like. On the one hand, there are those interested in providing epistemological criteria for good argumentation. For these theorists, the main question is should we accept this claim on the basis of those reasons? . On the other hand, there are those interested in “characterizing” what is good argumentation. For them, the main question is: does this piece of argumentation count as good argumentation, taking into account the conception of good argumentation that underlies the practice of arguing? . Both accounts assimilate the goals of a normative theory of argumentation to the goals of a theory of justification, but the former focuses on the conditions for considering that a target-claim is justified, whereas the latter tries to characterize the very concept of justification from the point of view of the practice of arguing. In this paper, I analyze the rewards and shortcomings of both epistemological conceptions of Argumentation Theory and their corresponding criteriological and transcendental accounts of the sort of objectivity that good argumentation is able to provide

Giving Reasons, A Contribution to Argumentation Theory

En Giving Reasons: A Linguistic-pragmatic-approach to Argumentation Theory (Springer, 2011), propongo un nuevo modelo para la evaluación semántica y pragmática de la argumentación. Este modelo se basa en una caracterización de la argumentación como un acto de habla compuesto de segundo orden. Explico las ventajas de este modelo respecto de otras propuestas dentro de la Teoría de la Argumentación, tales como la Pragma-dialéctica, la Lógica Informal, la Nueva Retórica o el Enfoque Epistémic